I. Introduction
Psychological approaches to personal identity are distinguished from body and biological accounts of identity by the former's insistence that some kind of mind is essential for our persistence. 1 A problem arises for those psychological approaches that are committed to the person being spatially coincident with, but distinct from the human animal and body. (For the purposes of this paper, the human animal will be identified with the organic body.) If the person can think, then it would appear that the human animal can also. The person and the animal share the same brain as well as every other atom of every other organ. Given this physical identity and the fact that they both have the same causal relations to the environment and linguistic community, why then should only one of the two beings have the ability to think? Such mental duplication appears inevitable on pain of violating the supervenience of the mental on the physical, construing the latter to include causal ties to the environment as well as the physical properties of the animal. And if both can think then there arises what Olson called the "epistemic problem" of being unable to know whether one is the human animal or the person. The dilemma that both the person and the human animal can think has been labeled by Sydney Shoemaker "The Problem of Too Many Minds." 2 I prefer to call it the problem of too many thinkers since it could be that two thinkers share one mind much as conjoined twins could share one bruise.
Shoemaker maintains that when a functionalist theory of mind is combined with his belief about individuating properties and the well-known cerebrum transplant thought experiement, the resulting position will be a version of the psychological approach to personal identity that can avoid
The Problem of Too Many Thinkers. I don't believe that Shoemaker's account has satisfactorily ruled out the biological account's solution to The Problem of Too Many Thinkers which identifies human persons and human animals while maintaining their persistence conditions are those characteristic of 3 an organism. 3 The costs of Shoemakers' solution -that the human animal is incapable of thought -are too high. But even if I am wrong about how well his account can avoid the biological approach's concerns, The Problem of Too Many Thinkers does not go away. This is because Shoemaker has not provided an argument against there existing a merely sentient being (I am using "sentient" as a synonym for "conscious") that is not essentially self-consciousness but is spatially coincident with a person who is essentially self-conscious. Both the person and the merely sentient being will transplanted when the cerebrum is. 4 And another thought experiment will make it impossible for Shoemaker's causal powers account won't by itself establish that the bearer of mental properties is a creature that has them essentially. In fact, the causal mental powers of one thinker may have been produced by the mental properties of another thinker. This has to be admitted because the particular instantiations of mental properties in my mind can cause certain mental states and powers in you and we obviously aren't the same substance. So causal ties between mental properties and mental powers are not enough to determine that they inhere in the same thinker. Some other independent account of the appropriate causal ties will determine the bearer of the mental properties since merely contributing causal powers won't suffice. So Shoemaker is assuming that in the transplant scenario there are the appropriate causal connections that make mental contents the contents of the same substance. And this involves the familiar appeal of the psychological approach to personal identity to psychological continuity of memories, desires, beliefs, intentions etc. A cerebrum transplant will thus appear to preserve personal identity since wherever the recipient of the cerebrum is to be found, so will what appear to be the memories, desires, intentions and beliefs of the pre-transplant person.
However, there are available some plausible arguments that people's intuitions about such brain 6 transplant scenarios mislead them.
Although it might initially sound rather odd, the advocate of the biological approach to personal identity can claim that there is not one thinking entity calculating the entire math problem in Shoemaker's example. Instead, one being started the equation and a different individual finished it, even though neither knew of this teamwork. So even if mental properties are individuated -a la
Shoemaker -by their contributions to the causal powers of the subject that has them, since they can also cause mental states in other beings as well, psychological continuity is no guarantee that only one thinker is involved. And it may be that the mental properties bestow shorter lived causal powers upon the animal. So while a Shoemaker-like argument might explain why an aggregate of atoms briefly constituting a person can't think because its persistence conditions don't provide for a long enough existence, the same reasoning can't extend to the animal for the period prior to the cerebrum transplant.
What the advocate of the biological approach to personal identity has to do is to explain away the appeal of the two considerations that lead most readers to maintain that the best description of the transplantation of an intact cerebrum involves a person switching bodies. The first has to do with the appearance of uninterrupted consciousness and a person's later insistence that he can remember the thoughts that he had during this transplant process and before it transpired. The second has to do with the prudential (or quasi-prudential) concern felt for the future well-being of the recipient of one's cerebrum. There are grounds for reinterpreting the phenomena that give rise to the first reason to believe body-switching is possible. The philosophy of mind literature provides us with a number of scenarios where the alleged recollection of certain thought content is false because there was actually no thinking going on at that earlier time. Consider Davidson's Swampman who comes into existence when lightning hits certain swamp chemicals. Let's say that the result is a being with a brain 7 physically identical to the reader's. Swampman doesn't initially think since he lacks the requisite causal connections to objects and perhaps also because he is not a member of a linguistic community.
Later, after he has obtained the causal contacts sufficient for thought, he will insist that he had thoughts back in the swamp. But he would be wrong if a certain kind of externalist about semantic content are correct.
Something similar would be true if each of us was a duplicate in a series of short-lived beings.
Each of our predecessors existed but for a split second, which isn't enough time to have a thought.
Each can utter a syllable before replacement. But the replacement occurs so smoothly and quickly that observers believe that one person has persisted throughout. We, who are the last in the series differ from our short-lived predecessors in that we have existed long enough to acquire meaningful thoughts. But we will insist that we have memories of earlier events when we didn't exist but were preceded by a series of beings each existing for but a brief moment and undergoing a fraction of the physical changes that a person who persisted through the entire time would have undergone. Our "memories" are false, thus they are perhaps not memories. The second reason most people would (mistakenly) believe that they are each identical to the being that ends up with their functioning cerebrum is that this being would be the one whose future they care about if they pondered the possibility of a transplant before it occurred. Their concern is taken as tracking identity. But here the lessons of fission may again be relevant. Parfit, as well as Shoemaker, famously argued that there was something like prudential concern for the mental life realized by each transplanted hemisphere. 6 Even the most selfish person would probably admit to caring about what would happen to each of the persons with half of his upper brain. They would have many of his beliefs, desires, concerns, values as well as the parts of his brain that are sensitive to pain.
He would certainly care if one of his cerebral hemispheres were destroyed in the removal process and the only the other was successfully transplanted for then in the absence of branching (fissioning) he would appear to survive. But it is hard to imagine him caring (much) less if both hemispheres were successfully transplanted, though as a result of this double success he would not survive as either of the two resulting persons. So the quasi-prudential concern that he would feel before the fissioning for the resulting pair of beings does not indicate anything metaphysically important about his identity because he would cease to exist with fissioning. The upshot is that prudential concern doesn't matter metaphysically. It doesn't tell us anything about our identity and probably misleads us in cases of undivided brain transplants. Shoemaker's position would be much stronger if like Unger, Baker and
Velleman he claimed what mattered in survival weren't satisfied in the non-identity preserving fission scenario.
Once he allows what matters to be preserved without identity in the fission case, his claim that the undivided transplant case is identity preserving is weakened.
The advocate of the biological approach to personal identity will maintain that if the lessons of Swampman, the series of short-lived duplicates, and the persons resulting from fissioning, all of whom mistakenly believe that they had thoughts before they actually did, are combined with Parfit's insight about prudential concern, we have been provided with resources to challenge Shoemaker's interpretation of a scenario of apparently uninterrupted thought during a whole cerebrum transfer. The transplant of the cerebrum would not involve a person switching bodies, only a person who wrongly thinks he once had a different body. Now some readers might think that the result is a stalemate: they have their initial transplant intuitions, but have since been provided with an alternative account to explain away the appearance of continuous thought and body switching. Maybe they still think, as I do, that the account of the transplant offered by psychological approach to personal identity is slightly more compelling because they can't help but believe that identity is what matters and that our concern tracks identity. What is to make them favor one analysis of cerebrum transplants over the other? Perhaps the advocate of the biological approach to personal identity will maintain that this tie can be broken, or the psychological account's slightly greater appeal can be offset, if the reader considers the extent of belief revision that
Shoemaker demands of biologists. Biologists are going to be quite surprised to learn that no animal can think. Shoemaker must deny thought to any animal, not just human animals. Shoemaker admits that removing the part of a dog's brain that is responsible for its consciousness would be the transplanting of the dog -if the dog is the sentient being that is spatially coincident with the canine animal. Shoemaker writes:
What happens if the cerebrum from the head of one dog is transplanted into the head of another, carrying with it the psychology of the first? It sounds harsh to say that dogs are not a kind of animals. It is probably not true that "dog" relates to "canine animal" the way "person" relates to "human animal," permitting the formulation of the claim that the relation of dogs to canine animals is one of constitution rather than identity. But if not, I think we could introduce a sortal term that does so relate to "canine animal" and that the claim it would enable us to formulate would be true. 7 This means that before such a removal, the biological entity, the canine, was not conscious. A different entity, spatially coincident with the animal, was thinking the dog thoughts and feeling the dog emotions. The entity that loses its brain in the operating room of the "mad veterinarian," has not suddenly lost its capacity for sentience, it never had such a capacity. Nor did the animal ever have the capacity for actions resulting from conscious mental states. The logic of Shoemaker's thesis would entail that spatially coincident with every crow, fish, and frog and the like, there is a merely sentient being that could be transplanted when its brain was. However, the less impressive the mind of an animal, and the less distinctive its personality, the less important the mind seems to the identity of its possessor. Because of this, readers might be more likely to resist Shoemaker's transplant thesis with "lower" animals. They may doubt that a creature with the mind of a bird is transplanted when its cerebrum is. The hope of the advocate of the biological approach to personal identity is that these readers extend such skepticism towards the transplantation of the person's cerebrum.
Any skepticism the reader harbors towards this thesis of Shoemaker's may be strengthened by considerations of ontogenetic biological development. Before and after birth the human animal, like many other animals, develops an immune system, various organs, tissues, muscles, teeth, hair etc.
which enable it to survive in its environmental niche. And just as animals develop non-conscious adaptive capabilities, so it would seem that they acquire early on in their lives many conscious powers to meet the challenges of their environment. 8 But this isn't true if Shoemaker's thesis is correct. Not only is an animal incapable of thought, but it doesn't act. If actions occur only when there are intentions, then all actions involve mentation, and thus it is not the canine animal that acts but only the spatially coincident thinking entity for whom Shoemaker plans to introduce a new sortal name.
The advocate of the biological approach to personal identity might further undermine Readers would be mistaken if they thought that I was suggesting that consciousness on Shoemaker's account is not a product of evolution. My complaint is only that it is not a property exemplified by an evolving animal. What makes the Shoemaker story so difficult to fit into an evolutionary world view is that the genotypical basis for persons is a part of the animal but the phenotypical expression is not. And yet the phenotypical expression is not like an animal artifact that comes to exist independent of the animal like a nest or dam. Rather, it comes to exist in the same place as the animal and is composed of the exact same matter.
Part V. Mere Sentience, Self-Consciousness and The Problem of Too Many Thinkers Unbeknownst to Shoemaker, another version of The Problem of Too Many Thinkers emerges from the transplant of a dominant cerebral hemisphere. Even if both hemispheres are capable of realizing self-consciousness, imagine that one hemisphere has lost the ability to realize more than mere sentience prior to the transplantation of the other hemisphere that is capable of supporting not just mere sentience but also self-consciousness. The being with the impaired cerebrum would be like a newborn, an Alzheimer patient, or lower animal that was sentient but not self-consciousness and thus unable to think about its thoughts. An important question is that if the two hemispheres just mentioned belonged to the listener, where would the listener be found if the hemispheres were separated and the one capable of supporting self-consciousness transplanted into a cerebrumless body just like that of the listener? I suspect that most listeners will not see this as a case of fissioning out of existence but will identify with the individual that has the hemisphere that is capable of realizing selfconsciousness. Shoemaker himself provides reasons to take this view since he relies upon Nozick's closest continuer approach in cases of asymmetrical branching. 9 The self-conscious individual will believe it is the listener and will have thoughts about its past, present and future. The other, devoid of self-consciousness, will be living in the present, unable to think of itself as having done anything in the past or future. What this identification suggests is that listeners are essentially self-conscious persons, not merely sentient thinking beings. This thought experiment, unlike the "normal" whole cerebrum transplant, can determine whether we are essentially self-conscious persons rather than essentially merely sentient beings that are only contingently self-conscious. Even if one insists that the merely sentient creature is new, i.e., just budded into existence while the transplanted person is not, it still seems that there are possible scenarios in which there is a sentient being that is not a self-conscious person. Shoemaker is thus wrong to claim that whenever there is consciousness there is self-consciousness. 10 It seems that a late fetus or newborn is conscious but without being self-conscious or psychologically continuous with any later creature. And likewise for the brain zap victim reduced to an infant-like state that Shoemaker claims is not identical to the person who possessed the brain prior to zapping. 11 Moreover, the advanced Alzheimer's patient too would lack the psychological continuity, integration and self-consciousness that Shoemaker claims characterizes a person. I don't think the merely sentient individuals with the zapped or Alzheimer's riddled brains just came into existence. And it seems very implausible to maintain that a sentient baby went out of existence when the capacity for self-consciousness arose and a person emerged, and then perhaps came back into existence when an injury or disease caused the loss of self-consciousness. So if there is a thinking being that is a mere sentient being distinct from the organism and the person, there still looks like a problem of too many thinkers will arise.
We seem to be left with two spatially coincident conscious beings. Both are necessarily 16 thinking beings but only one is a person and essentially self-conscious, the other being contingently self-conscious and able to exist without being able to reflect upon its conscious states. An Olson-like epistemic problem of being unable to determine whether one is the essentially merely sentient being or the essentially self-conscious person could only be avoided if the sentient non-person doesn't have the capacity to become even contingently self-conscious. By why shouldn't it have that capacity if the physically identical person does? It is hard to understand why different persistence conditions should prevent two thinking beings possessing the same brain from having similar mental capacities. So even if Shoemaker's response to the biological account of personal identity is adequate -and we have surveyed some reasons to doubt that animals are mindless -he is still left with one too many thinkers.
A final worry is that Shoemaker's functionalism, his theory of individuating properties by the causal powers they bestow upon their subject, and his psychological continuity account of personal identity fail to provide the means to prevent the brain, or a part of it, from being a thinking being. The 
